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HISTORY
ROUTE 2
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1 – COMMUNISM IN CRISIS 1976–89

Thursday 12 May 2011 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.

Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ...; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to Gorbachev and his aims/policies (glasnost and perestroika) and consequences for the Soviet state.

SOURCE A Extract from The War That Never Was: The Fall of the Soviet Empire 1985–1991 by David Pryce-Jones, 1995.

Gorbachev's trouble was that he weakened his own system. His only instrument of power was the Communist Party, but his reforms weakened precisely that instrument. He was like the proverbial man sawing off the branch on which he was sitting. ... The moment a new NEP-type [NEP = New Economic Policy] reform began, the party started to disintegrate and lose control. ... Although Gorbachev had premonitions [thoughts] of the destructive power of television, he found that he could not stop deputies using television to promote themselves. For the first time people could see their leaders as they were. Once they felt that the centralized power (of the party) had weakened, they (the people) perceived that there was no very great risk any longer in demanding higher standards of confidence and honesty. Glasnost was devised [intended] to keep the party obedient by unleashing criticism of it from outside, but there was no way in between. Either you have a party-controlled centralized regime or you have a democracy.

SOURCE B Extract from **Yeltsin:** A **Life** by Timothy J Colton, 2008. Colton is professor of Government and Russian Studies at Harvard University, USA.

Although Mikhail Gorbachev presided over the decline of the Communist Party and the ending of Soviet mastery in Eastern Europe, it was Yeltsin, the first elected national leader in Russia's long history, who buried the Soviet Union itself. ... Gorbachev reminds us that "perestroika started from above. It could not have been otherwise in totalitarian conditions". The Soviet old guard [long serving party members] warded it off as best they could. Newcomers to power gave it impetus and set the terms under which non-leaders entered into it. Not always alert to the effects, they let change snowball from reform to revolution. Thereupon, Yeltsin, and his supporters, came to constitutional choices about the future after Communism and after the USSR.

SOURCE C

Extract from **Mikhail Gorbachev: Memoirs** by Mikhail Gorbachev, 1995. Gorbachev is a former Soviet leader.

After leaving the Kremlin ... I faced the question: what to do next? ... My conscience was clear. The promise I had made to the people when I started the process of perestroika was kept: I gave them freedom. This was reflected in many quite specific things: glasnost, freedom of speech, the ending of ideological persecution, the right to live anywhere one wanted, the removal of the monopoly on property and power, the creation of the foundations of a genuine parliamentary system, the end of the nightmare threat of nuclear war, and openness to the world, which responded with understanding and support for our desire to become a normal democratic state. Perestroika did not give the people prosperity, something they expected of me, as head of state. ... But I did not promise that. I urged people to use this new-found freedom to create prosperity, personal and social prosperity, with their own hands and minds, according to the abilities of each.

SOURCE D


Extract from "Gorbachev and Glasnost – A New Soviet Order? Implications for US Foreign Policy" by Thomas M Magstadt, taken from the journal **Policy Analysis**, March 1989. Magstadt was chairman of the Political Science department at Kearney State College, USA.

To summarize the argument thus far: Gorbachev is no doubt sincere about economic reforms, because without them the Soviet Union is facing a period of decline. Glasnost is the price Gorbachev must pay to get Soviet workers behind perestroika (which entails risks and sacrifices, especially in the short run). *Demokratizatsia* [towards democracy] has been little more than superficial up to this point, although some signs, such as occasional dissenting votes cast in the Supreme Soviet, hint at new possibilities. ... The bottom line is "Soviet young people must rethink old prejudices and past norms of Soviet behaviour". In other words, even if structural change does occur, it will not be irreversible until or unless it is accompanied by a transformation of the underlying political structure – a slow process, at best.

2211-5332 **Turn over**

SOURCE E

A cartoon by Michael Cummings, published in the **Daily Express**, a British newspaper, 24 August 1988.



© Express Newspapers. Used with permission. The man shown in the cartoon is Mikhail Gorbachev.

- 1. (a) What, according to Source A, were the problems facing Gorbachev as a result of his policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring)? [3 marks]
 - (b) What is the message conveyed by Source E? [2 marks]
- 2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources A and B about Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika and their consequences for the Soviet Union. [6 marks]
- 3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source C and Source D for historians studying Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika. [6 marks]
- 4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, analyse the contribution made by the policies of glasnost and perestroika to the collapse of the Soviet Union. [8 marks]